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NATIONALPRODUCTIVITY
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Here we focus our attention on the relative contribution of total factor input
and productivity to economic growth in the national economy during the
period 1948-66. To obtain growth rates, we use the real net national product
(NNP), adjusted to allow for a 1 per cent per annum average increase of total
factor productivity in general government. But since economic progress
cannot occur unless real NNPgrowsfaster than population, we shall also look
at the relative contributions of total factor productivity and real total factor
input, per capita, to rates of growth in real NNP, per capita.
There is also interest in the relative growth rates of labor and property
income—in the changing functional distribution of income. We shall examine
this aspect of growth in terms of relative changes in productivity and in real
price of the two major classes, as well as more broadly in terms of the
historical elasticity of substitution during the' period covered. This analysis is
confined to the business economy, for which independent measures of
property and labor income are available.
In view of its major role in economic growth, perhaps the greatest interest
centers on the causal factors behind productivity growth. In the final section,
we shall discuss causes, with particular emphasis on the proximate deter-
minants in the form of growth in real intangible capital stock resulting from
investments in: research and development, education and training, and other
activities designed to increase the quality, or productive efficiency, of the
tangible factor inputs, human and nonhuman.
The Role of Productivity in
Economic Growth and Progress
Between 1948 and 1966, real NNP (adjusted for government productivity
advance, as described in the previous chapter) increased at an average annual
rate of 4.1 per cent. Total net factor productivity rose at an average annualNational Productivity and Economic Growth 65
rate of 2.3 per cent, while real tangible factor inputs grew at a comparable
rate of 1 .8 per cent. (See Table 4-1). Thus, we may say that productivity
advance accOunted for roughly 56 per cent of total economic growth over the
period.Itwill be recalled from Productivity Trends that prior to 1919
productivity accounted for well under half the overall growth, rate. After
1919 it generally accounted for more than half. We recognize, of course, that
productivity as "the residual" reflects various forces that affect the produc-
tive efficiency of the tangible factors. But we defer until the last section of
the chapter an attempt to probe more deeply into underlying causes.
The relative impact of productivity advance differed considerably in the
subperiods. In the first and last subperiods, 1948-53 and 1960-66, when the
growth rate of real NNP exceeded 5 per cent, productivity grew only slightly
faster than real tangible inputs. During the two middle subperiods, the rate of
productivity advance decelerated, but the rate of increase in real factor input
fell much more, so that productivity advance accounted for around three-
quarters of the aggregate growth rate.
The role of productivity stands out much more prominently, when we view
it in relation to the rate of economic progress. Real NNP per capita rose at an
average annual rate of 2.4 per cent. Real factor input per capita increased by
only 0.1 per cent a year, so the 2.3 per cent annual rate of productivity
advance accounted for almost all of the economic progress achieved between
1948 and 1966. (See Table 4-1 and Chart 4-1.) The figure per cent may
seem small, but given the power of compound interest, it means that real
NNP per capita doubles every thirty years or so, thanks almost entirely to
the forces that promote productivity advance. This is the same rate of
progress experienced from 1889 to 1919,' but in the earlier period input per
capita grew at a 1.0 per cent rate per annum. From 1919 to 1948, produc-
tivity advance accelerated, but input per capita fell somewhat, and the annual
growth rate of real NNP was retarded to 1.5 per cent. Although the 2.4 per
cent growth rate since 1948 is the same as in the period before 1919, the
relative importance of productivity advance is much greater.
We recognize that real NNP per capita is scarcely an ideal welfare measure.
National product, as currently estimated, excludes various kinds of non.
market economic activity, the value of which would add more than 50 per
cent to the present aggregates.2 Also, deductions are not made for certain
costs of producing final goods and services that are not included in NNP, or,
more importantly, that might be imputed, such as the costs and disutffities
1 See Productivity Trends, Table 8,p. 84.
2 For rough estimates of the imputed values of major nonmarket economic activities,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.National Productivity and Economic Growth 67
Chart 4-1: Components of Real Net National Product per Capita, Average Annual Rates
of Change, 1948—66
A.Derivation of Real NNP per Capita
,
Source: Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
a The difference between real
panel A.
NNP per capita and total factor productivity shown in
associated with environmental pollution. Evenif NNP could befully and
accurately estimated, it would only furnish the basis for estimates of changes
in potential welfare. Nevertheless, if its limitations are borne in mind, real
NNPpercapita provides a useful point of departure for assessing the rate of
material progress.3
3 See Moses Abramo'vitz's essay "The Welfare Interpretation of SecularTrends in
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As shown in Table 4-1, the rates and components of change differ
significantly over the several subperiods. Real NNPpercapita increased at an
average annual rate of 3.2 per cent between 1948 and 1953, but decelerated
during the subsequent two subperiods to 1960, reflecting not only some
deceleration in the rate of productivity advance but, more importantly, a
decline of around 1 per cent a year, on the average, in real total factor input
per capita. In the final subperiod 1960-66, the rate of advance in real NNP
per capita rose to a new high of 3.7 per cent a year. This reflected the return
of the annual rate of productivity advance to the almost 2.6 per cent
recorded in the first period, and an acceleration in the growth rate of real
input per capita to 1.1 per cent a year.
In view of the importance of real input per capita, particularly for swthgs
in the rates of change of real NNP per capita, it is worthwhile to examine its
components (see Table 4-2). First of all, the 0.11 per cent average annual rate
of increase in total factor input per capita during the period 1948-66
represents a weighted average of a 0.3 per cent .drop in labor input per capita
and a 1.8 per cent increase in capital input per capita. The decline in factor
input in the two middle subperiods', 1953-57 and 1957-60, reflected a
decelerating growth rate in real capital and substantial declines in labor input
relative to population. The 1.1 per cent rate of growth in the 1960-66
subperiod mirrored a renewed surge in capital input per capita back to around
2 per cent a year and the highest growth rate in labor inpUt per capita of the
postwar period—almost 1 per cent a year, on the average.
The rates of change in labor input per capita may be, in turn, broken down
into the three components shown in Table 4-2 and Chart 4.1. Thus, the 0.3
per cent annual rate of decline during 1948-66 reflects declines of 0.3 per
cent each in the percentage of the population in work status (persons engaged
per capita) and in average hours worked per year, counterbalanced in part by
a rise of 0.3 per cent a year in the rate of increase in labor input per
man-hour. The latter element measures the relative shift of workers and
man-hours into high-pay industries, continuing a historical trend. The decline
in the proportion of population working was due to a drop in the ratio of
labor force to total population as the proportion of unproductive age groups
rose during the period covered; the ratio of employment to labor force was
the same in 1966 as in 1948. The decline in average hours worked also
represents a continuation of a secular trend.
The drop in labor input per capita during the two middle subperiods
reflects primarily a decline in the proportion of the population in work

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































070 Postwar Productivity Trends
civilian labor force, from 2.9 per cent in 1953 to 4.3 per cent in 1957 and on
up to 5.5 per cent in 1960.
The significant rise in labor input per capita in the last subperiod reflects a
renewed rise of an average 0.5 per cent a year in persons engaged per capita as
unemployment fell back to 3.8 per cent of the civilian labor force in 1966; an
increase of 0.5 per cent a year in labor input per man-hour; and a retarded
decline in average hours worked of less than 0.1 per cent a year.
Factor Prices, Productivity, and Income Shares
It is a truism that the rate of change in productivity is equal to the rate of
change in the ratio of average input prices to average output prices (at factor
cost). Thus, between 1948 and 1966 the private domestic business economy
showed average annual increases of 3.9 per cent in the average factor price, of
1.4 per cent in the average output price, and of 2.5 per cent in the ratio of
the two price series—the same rate of increase as in total factor productivity
(see Table 4-3). The rise in factor input prices relative to output prices, which
is proportionate to the productivity increase, is the means whereby produc-
tivity gains are distributed to the owners of the factors of production. One
can regard productivity gain as an increase in the "real price" of a unit of
factor input, or as the increase in unit real factor income, since it is the same
as factor income per unit deflated by the index of average prices of outputs
(at factor cost).
These relationships do not tell us anything about inflationary processes.
We cannot know whether factor price increases (less the productivity in-
crease) pushed up product prices or product price increases (plus the produc-
tivity increase) pulled up factor prices, nor do we know the extent to which
there was an interaction between the two. An analysis of inflation would have
to include the study of disaggregated industry estimates, timing relationships,
monetary factors, the profit-rate component of the price of capital, institu-
tional factors, and so on. But we do know that the owners of the factors of
production, in the aggregate, are unable to raise the real price per unit of
combined factor input any faster than total factor productivity advances
permit.
If the increase in average factor prices exactly equaled the increase in
productivity, there would be no change in the product price index. The
product price index would also remain stable if the average price of each
factor rose exactly in proportion to the increase in the corresponding partial
productivity ratio and the factor shares of national income remained con-
stant. Or, given changes in the product price level, product shares wouldNational Productivity and Economic Growth 71
TABLE 4-3
Private Domestic Business Economy:
Factor Incomes, Inputs, Prices, and Productivity, 1948-66,
Link Relatives and Rates of Change































Note: Property refers to net capital.
Source:Factor income and percentage shares of income: Table 4-4; implicit
price deflator: Department of Commerce; real factor input and factor produc-
tivity: Table A-20; real factor income, factor price, and real factor price: by
computation.
remain constant if the real price of each factor rose in proportion to the
increase in the corresponding partial productivity ratio.
But if the real price of one factor rises more than its productivity ratio72 Postwar Productivity Trends
(made possible by a drop in the real price of the other factor relative to its
productivity ratio), then the share of that factor in national income will
increase. This is precisely what happened to labor income in the business
economy from 1948 to 1966, on net balance. The real price of labor rose at
an average rate of 3.3 per cent a year, representing a 4.7 per cent rate of
increase in average hourly compensation deflated by the product price de-
flator, which rose at a1.4 per cent annual rate. Average annual labor
compensation was obtained by diyiding total labor compensation by weighted
man-hours, so that the 4.7 per cent rate of increase does not reflect inter-
industry man-hour shifts, and thus the real-average-hourly-compensation
series is consistent with the real-pro duct-per-unit-of-labor-input series. The
3.3 per cent rise in real average hourly compensation exceeds by a bit more
than 0.2 per cent the 3.1 per cent average annual rate of increase in real
product per unit of labor input. This 0.2 per cent relative increase may also
be called the increase in real unit labor costs, which is the quotient of real
average hourly earnings and labor productivity.
As a result of this rise, the labor share of factor income originating in the
domestic business economy expanded from 69.7 per cent in 1948 to 72.5 per
cent in 1966—another average annual rate of increase of 0.2 per cent (see
Table 4-4), and approximately the rate of advance as that recorded
between 1929 (when the labor share was 67.3 per cent) and 1948. It is also
TABLE 4-4
Factor Income Originating in the
Private Domestic Business Economy,
by Type,
Selected Years. 19 29-66
Factor Income
(Billions of Dollars) Per Cent Distribution
Total Labor Property Labor Property
1929 78.8 53.0 25.8 67.3 32.7
1948 200.2 139.6 60.6 69.7 30.3
1953 263.7 194.8 68.9 73.9 26.1
1957 314.3 234.7 79.6 74.7 25.3
1960 351.4 264.8 86.7 75.3 24.7
1966 519.9 376.7 143.1 72.5 27.5
Note: Details may nOt add to total due to rounding.
Source: Department of Commerce estimates, with an allocation of proprietors'
income as described in the appendix.National Productivity and Economic Growth 73
the same rate I obtained ma previous study for the expansion in the labor
share of gross private domestic product (including households and private
nonprofit institutions, excluded from the preserit analysis) between 1919 and
As shown in Table 4-4, however, there was a drop in the labor share
between 1960 and 1966, but the increase was subsequently resumed.
The uptrend in the real price of labor and its share in national income was
accompanied by an average decline in the real price of capital of 0.06 per cent
a year, compared with a 0.47 per cent annual increase in capital productivity.
The 0.5 per cent rate of decline in real capital cost annually per unit of
output is consistent with the decline in its share of business factor income
from 30.3 per cent in 1948 to 27.5 per cent in 1966. (See Tables 4-3 and
4-4.) Note also that the 0:5 per cent rate of decline jn unit real capital cost
per year, weighted by the 0.25 per cent share of capital, approximately equals
the 0.2 per cent rate of increase in unit real labor cost, weighted by its
percentage share in the base period.5
If the capital deflator shows the same movement as the overall product
deflator, then the slight decline in the real price of capital may .be interpreted
as occurring in the rate of return on capital assets .ät market pricesi. We have
not disentangled the rate-of-return and capital-asset price components of our
capital price measure. But in view of the high rate of return prevailing in 1948
due to postwar capital shortages, it seems unlikely that the 1966 rate of
return was higher, despite the significant increase from 1960. Unfortunately,
time has not permitted us to pursue this aspect. of postwar economic develop-
ments more fully.
Another way of explaining statistically the rise in the real price of labOr
and its income share is to view it as the product of changes in the relative
quantities of factor inputs arid in the relative prices of thefactors. Thus, labor
input relative to tOtal factor input dropped'by an average annual rate of 0.55,
while the price of labor rose by an average 0.80 per cent a year relative to
total factor price. The sum of these two rates is 0.25, which is approximately
the rate of change in labor's share.
Since the rate of decline in relative labor input was more than offset by
4 See John W. Kendrick and Ryuzo Sato, "Factor Prices, Pioductivity, and Economic
Growth," American Economic Review, December 1963. The relationships among the
variables discussed in this section are developed mathematically in Appendix A of that
article, pp. 985-96.
The implications of this relationship for "wage-price guideposts" are discussed in
Kendrick and Sato (See footnote 4), p. 979; see also John W. Kendrick, "The Wage-Price-
Productivity Issue," California Management Review, Spring 1962.74 Postwar Productivity Trends
the rate of increase in the relative price of labor, it is apparent that the
"historical" elasticity of substitution for the period was less than unity. In
interpreting the coefficients presented below, it must'be remembered that
elasticities of substitution calculated from historical time series do not have
the same meaning as the concept used in equilibrium theory. That is, in
addition to indicating the relationship between relative changes in the prices
and quantities of the factors, the coefficients may also reflect changes in the
degree of disequilibrium in a dynamic economy, technological changes that
are not neutral with respect to labor and capital requirements per unit of
output, and so on. Nevertheless, the coefficients are useful summary measures
of the historical relationship between relative changes in prices and quantities
(we shall refer to them simply as "coefficients" in order to remind the reader
of the several forces that may affect the relationship).
One way of estimating the coefficient of substitution is as the quotient of
the two rates given above: 0.55/0.80 =0.69.An alternative formula involves
the difference between the growth rates of capital and labor inputs, divided
by the difference between the growth rates of the real prices of labor and
capital. Presumably, the small difference between the two estimates is due to
rounding of the underlying index numbers and the derived rates of change.
The coefficient of substitution estimated here compares to one of 0.58 I
estimated for the period 19 19-60 in the article cited earlier.6 It is even closer
to an estimate by Kravis of
The rates of change in factor shares can be related directly to the
coefficient of substitution.8 Thus, the growth rate of the labor share can be
estimated as the difference between the rates of growth in real labor and
capital inputs (0.89 -3.52=—2.63)times 1 minus the reciprocal of the
coefficient of substitution (1 —1/0.66=—0.52),weighted by the share of
capital in factor income, 0.25. The result is 03, which approximates the rate
of growth of the labor share (with allowance for rounding errors). In other
words, with a coefficient of substitution of less than unity, the factor with a
relative decline of input obtains an increasing share of income. Given the
relative growth of the factor inputs 1948-66, the coefficient of 0.66 is
consistent with the increases in the real price of labor and its share of income
as we have estimated them.
It has been argued that these relationships, and the market mechanisms
6 Kendrick and Sato, p. 981.
IrvingB. Kravis, "Relative Income Shares in Fact and Theory," American Eco-
no,nic Review, December 1959, pp. 917.49.
8 Kendrick and Sato, Appendix A, equations 14 and 15.National Productivity and Economic Growth 75
which facilitate them, augur well for the viability of the American economy.9
That is, there appears to have been no pronounced long-run trend in the rate
of return on capital, despite a significant fraction of income saved. Further,
the rate of return has generally been adequate to induce a volume of tangible
investment consistent with a high level of employment of resources. The rate
of investment has provided a significant rate of increase in real capital stock
and input per worker and per unit of labor input. As a result of the increasing
relative abundance of capital and relative scarcity of labor, real income per
unit of labor input has risen even faster than labor productivity. Given a
historical coefficient of substitution of less than unity, as we have seen, this
means that labor's share of factor income has risen.
Some economists argue that a rising labor share of income has made it
easier to sustain adequate levels of aggregate demand. We would stress, rather,
the development of built-in stabilizers and more informed macroeconomic
stabilization policies as an explanation for the steadier rate of economic
growth since World War II. Whatever its sources, the steadier growth of recent
decades has been associated with a reduced variability in rates of productivity
advance, as documented in Chapter 3.
Causal Factors Behind Productivity Advance
The analysis of the causal factors behind productivity advance is extremely
complex. The purpose of this section is not to undertake such an analysis.
Rather, my approach to the subject will be sketched briefly, with reference to
a related study I am currently conducting for the National Bureau of
Economic Research. In that study we present estimates of total investment
and capital stocks, and analyze their relationship to economic growth.1°
It is our basic hypothesis that the chief proximate determinant of produc-
tivity advance is the growth of the real stock of intangible capital resulting
from investments designed to increase the quality, or productive efficiency,
of the tangible human and nonhuman factors of production. In Productivity
Trends (pp. 104.10), we alluded, to outlays for research and development,
education and training, and medical care as "hidden investments." They are
9 Ibid.
See Forty-seventh Annual Report, NBER, pp. 9-15. A preliminary summary of
the findings is presented in John W. Kendrick, "The Treatment of Intangible Resources
as Capital," Review of Income and Wealth, March 1972, and in Kendrick, "Economic
Impacts of Scientific and Technological Progress," in Helen Penman, ed., The Research
Revolution and the Outlook for R&D in the 1970's, Menlo Park, Calif., Pacific Books,
Inc., forthcoming.76 Postwar Productivity Trends
indeed investments, in the same sense as tangible capital outlays, to the
extent that they increase output- and income-producing capacity in future
accounting periods. They are "hidden" in that they are not officially recog-
mzed as investments in the income, and product accounts. Indeed, some of
the intangible investments are not even included in the Commerce Depart-
ment estimates, particularly those which are charged to current expenses by
business, and those which involve imputations, such as the opportunity cost
of students.
In the companion study, we have prepared comprehensive estimates of
intangible investments, by type and by sector, in current and constant dollars
for the period since 1929. Further, we have developed experimental estimates
of the stocks of intangible capital,current and constant dollars, for the
same period, also by type and by sector of ownership and of use. Preliminary
results indicate that there has been a substantial rise since the 1920s not only
in intangible investment as a proportion of GNP but also in real stocks of
intangibles in relation to real tangible capital stocks. However, presentatIon of
our finished estimates, description of the sources and methods of estimation,
and a summary of the findings will have to await completion of the study
now in progress.
We recognize, of course, that there are factors other than the growth of
intangible capital stocks which may have an important bearing on produc-
tivity changes. In the short run, productivity change appears to have a
systematic relationship with the business cycle, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Chief among the longer-term factors are: changes in the degree of economic
efficiency as reflected in the allocation of resources, including the speed of
adjustment to dynamic changes in the economy; the rate of diffusion of
innovations; economies of scale, both internal and external, which are pro-
gressively affected by technological advance; and the average inherent quality
of human and natural resources which reflect changes in the resource mix as
well as possible trends within given resource categories. If analysis is confined
to the private economy, there is also the additional factor of the changing
volume of governmental inputs that affect productivity, trends in the private
sectors.
More fundamental are the basic values and socioeconomic institutions of
society. Whereas these generally change slowly with regard to their net impact
on productive efficiency and technological change, differences in values and
institutions among regions and nations are presumably an important element
in explaining differences in productivity levels and rates of change.